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 Doing the business?
Newspaper reporting of the business of football
j Raymond Boyle, William Dinan and Stephen Morrow
University of Stirling
A B S T R A C T
This research draws upon a growing interest within media sociology in the ways in
which news is shaped by information flows between sources; it focuses on how the
media, and newspapers in particular, report on the business aspects of the UK football
industry. Media interest in the workings of the City and issues of corporate governance
extend beyond the conventional business pages to encompass the sports pages,
commentary and even editorializing. The case study in this article centres on the
Scottish club, Celtic, and serves to illustrate how public interest in sport can help
illuminate aspects of how financial news is produced and reported in the print media.
The article argues that much of the growing and complex business side of the game
goes largely unreported and that there is evidence of an over-reliance on celebrity
sources by journalists and a lack of knowledge or experience among sports reporters in
reporting business stories.
K E Y W O R D S j Celtic j finance j football industry j print media j public
relations j sports journalism
Now our football commentators are role playing as business analysts and social
scientists. At a truly fascinating period for Scottish football, very little is being
added to the sum of understanding. (Smith, 2000: 5)
Introduction
This research draws upon a growing interest within media sociology in the
ways in which news is shaped by information flows between sources (Schle-
singer, 1990; Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994). The study of media–source
relations has highlighted the critical role played by public relations (PR)
professionals in mediating these information and news flows (Miller et al.,
1998; Miller and Dinan, 2000; Palmer, 2000). According to Michie (1998) the
power relations in the world of business reporting between journalists and
their sources are particularly skewed in favour of the latter – who tend to be PR
specialists in financial PR and investor relations. In his review of contempo-
rary media–source relations literature in the UK, Palmer suggests the field is
best understood in terms of two essential components. These are:
The reasons that journalists have for approaching sources, or more exactly, the
reasons they have for choosing between sources, including all the potential
sources who are not actually used [and] the reasons that sources have for
approaching journalists, or allowing journalists to approach them, or trying to
avoid this contact. (Palmer, 2000: vii)
The interests of the sources and the news values of the media organiza-
tions are interwoven in these relationships. What makes the sports–business–
media nexus such a compelling area for research is the high news value of
sport, especially football (soccer), in the UK (Boyle and Haynes, 2000). This
can transform the ‘publics’ normally addressed by financial and investor
relations specialists. Media interest in the workings of the City and issues of
corporate governance consequently extends beyond the conventional busi-
ness pages to encompass the sports pages, commentary and even editorializ-
ing. Clearly this has the potential to disrupt routine information flows
between sources and the media. The case of BSkyB’s attempted takeover of
Manchester United in 1998 illustrates this phenomenon. Rupert Murdoch’s
interest gave the story of this bid both a heightened visibility and a political
dimension. What was striking about the proposed takeover were the efforts
invested by interested parties in PR (PR Week, 1998) and in targeting their
campaign towards the news media (Brown and Walsh, 1999).
There is evidence that much of the reporting that fills the business pages
of the UK press is attributable to PR sources (Michie, 1998: 25). The case study
in this article – while focusing on a specific club (Celtic) and a particular media
market (Scotland) – serves to illustrate how public interest in sport, and its
attendant news value, can actually illuminate aspects of how financial news is
produced and reported in the print (and broadcast) media.
This research examines the 1998 putative takeover of Celtic (a club then
controlled by its majority shareholder Fergus McCann) by a consortium
including high-profile personalities such as the ex-Celtic star Kenny Dalglish
and the rock singer Jim Kerr. Since taking over the club in 1994, McCann had
consistently stated that he would stay for five years and that he would then
offer his shares in the first instance to existing shareholders, season ticket
holders and other Celtic supporters. As he reached the end of his tenure, the
club had over 10,000 shareholders and 50,000 season ticket holders, making it
the fifth best supported football club in the world.
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Two related themes concern us throughout this article. First, we examine
the extent to which journalists are over-reliant on particular sources. How
acute is this issue with specific regard to the reporting of the developing
football business industry? Second, we highlight the apparent lack of training
in financial and business matters which exists among sports journalists. To
contextualize the particularities of this case study we shall discuss some
broader aspects of media, especially newspaper reporting of the business of the
football industry in the UK.
Reporting the business of football
In recent years the business dimension of football has become more pro-
nounced. Examples of this incorporation of football are widespread: listing on
the Stock Exchange, hostile takeovers, a globalized market for players, football
clubs as brands and so on. However, while football at the highest level is now
clearly a business, it is not just a business. Football’s importance, reflected in
the extent of its coverage, cannot be reduced simply to economics; rather it is
related to its wider social, political and historical significance. Perhaps the key
distinction between football and more conventional businesses is the inade-
quacy of the concept of the customer to describe football supporters. The
concept is incomplete for two reasons. First, because it fails to consider the role
played by the supporters in creating the product they are being asked to buy;
and second, because it fails to recognize that being a football supporter is
fundamentally an issue of identity and attachment rather than one of eco-
nomics (King, 1997; Morrow, 1999: 166–71).
Growing interest in the business aspects of football is evident across the
media spectrum. For example, the City of London’s bible, The Financial Times,
has published a weekly sports page with journalists specializing in the cov-
erage of financial issues in sport since March 1997, while the subscription
market now also boasts specialized publications like SportBusiness International
and Soccer Investor. At the other end of the spectrum magazines such as Total
Football now have a ‘Football Finance’ page.
While increased coverage of the financial aspects of football in the media
is indisputable, concerns remain over its quality. One factor is the lack of
knowledge of financial matters among many sports journalists. Financial
expertise has traditionally been beyond the experience and training of most
journalists. At the time of Manchester United’s 1991 share float, one of the
club’s advisers, Glenn Cooper, commented: 
You had for the first time the crossover between sports journalists and City
journalists. The sports journalists were writing for the first time about City
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matters and the City journalists were writing for the first time about sporting
matters. By and large both made a complete cock-up of it. (Bose, 1999: 179)
Lack of familiarity with financial matters is understandable when the issue
at stake is masked in technical accounting language. For example, the Man-
chester United financial director, David Gill, discussing newspaper reporting
of the club’s transfer fee reserve, noted:
[Although] the City no longer requires the fiction [of the transfer fee reserve
account]; it does still serve a purpose – for the back pages. Every year . . . United’s
account keeps showing a Transfer Fee Reserve of £8 million, £12 million before
tax, which provokes another story in the popular papers of Fergie’s war chest of
£12 million – but it means nothing. United’s spending on players is not deter-
mined by what is in this fictional, notional Transfer Fee Reserve account. (Bose,
1999: 223)
Technical accounting issues aside, the business of football is not, however,
inherently complex. Nevertheless much of the reporting reveals an inability or
unwillingness to provide rational and meaningful comment on financial
matters.
A number of factors relating to the more general reporting of football in
the press influence the reporting of the business of football. Football journal-
ists operate in a closed world, in which they rely heavily on (a) other
journalists in the ‘pack’; (b) official and unofficial clubs’ spokespeople; (c)
players; and (d) agents as sources of information (Rowe, 1999: 36–63; Boyle
and Haynes, 2000: 165–86; Edworthy, 2000). This is particularly true of the
tabloid press, where pressure to secure a steady stream of back-page stories is
intense. Football news is now established as an integral part of a newspaper’s
armoury in the perpetual circulation wars. Hodkinson (2000: 60) has noted
how:
. . . often, there is collusion between players (or their agents) and reporters. They
will all hint that a player is unsettled to alert other clubs of his availability – this
might galvanise a transfer or improve an agent’s negotiating power. Reporters,
since they can become the confidants of players and managers, sometimes
become the unlikely go-betweens, piecing together transfers.
This closed interlinked world of players, clubs, agents and journalists is
even more acute in a small media market such as Scotland. In the following
sections, issues such as those that arose in the course of the attempted takeover
of Celtic plc in 1998 are discussed.
The ‘Old Firm’ and the media in Scotland
Celtic and Rangers – collectively known as the ‘Old Firm’ – are big fish in a
very small pond, dominating Scottish football both on and off the field.
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Between them they have been champions of the Scottish Premier League, or its
predecessor First Division, in all but six of the last 40 seasons. In financial
terms, 70 percent of total turnover for the Scottish Premier League for the year
1999/2000 is attributable to them (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2001). Notwith-
standing the small size of the Old Firm’s domestic (Scottish) marketplace,
highlighted in particular by its limited television income, the turnover of both
clubs remains large enough to ensure their inclusion in Deloitte & Touche’s
1998/99 Rich List of Europe’s 20 wealthiest clubs (Deloitte & Touche, 2000).
Before considering the communicative dimensions to the Jim Kerr/Kenny
Dalglish fronted consortium’s bid for Celtic plc it is worth briefly situating the
story within the communicative space of the Scottish public sphere (Schle-
singer, 1998; Schlesinger et al., 2001). One of the defining characteristics of
mediated communication in Scotland is the scale of the society and the
interconnectedness of personal networks therein. It is difficult to overstate the
visibility of Celtic and Rangers in Scottish life. Peter McLean, then Director of
PR at Celtic, described the phenomenon as follows:
I mean [Celtic] is unique. It’s the most covered item in Scottish life. It creates on
average 14,000 articles a year . . . in terms of a commodity, in selling newspapers,
it’s probably second to none. The Evening Times told us that in 1994 they analysed
their leading sales [and] that 81 percent of their leading sales days were lead by
Celtic stories. So from [a] marketing perspective, the number one thing that
would shift newspapers would be Celtic. (Interview, June 2000)
This extraordinary profile is, in some respects, the product of the ultra-
competitive Scottish media market. The media players involved are national
media (such as BBC Scotland, and national newspapers such as The Daily
Record and The Herald) with considerable news-gathering resources. As a
consequence their relationship with the Old Firm is significantly different
from the relationships between many large British football clubs and the local
media in their respective cities. The exposure of both clubs places considerable
demands on their PR departments which must continuously manage their
external communications. In terms of Celtic’s PR, a key feature of the brand is
the social mission statement of the club. How easily this sits alongside the
club’s status as a plc is difficult to determine, but for those communicating
Celtic to the public the importance of the club’s community involvement is
continually emphasized.
In the Scottish media, market stories about the Old Firm are viewed as
crucial in terms of attracting readers, listeners and viewers. While contacts and
sources are vital for football journalists throughout Britain, the dominance
exerted by the Glasgow clubs in the small Scottish market makes contacts with
these clubs crucial. This also makes it more difficult for journalists, particularly
those in the press, to level criticism at these sources. It is worth noting the
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extensive linkage in personnel between and across media institutions in
Scotland. For example, journalists and pundits may work for both radio and
television and also regularly appear in the press. Such are the close ties
between the worlds of football and sports journalism in Scotland, that ex-
players can operate as newspaper columnists, regular summarizers on radio
and television as well as players’ agents, without any apparent conflict of
interest.
One should also note the impact that wider shifts in the media landscape
and economy have had on football journalism. The centrality of the market,
particularly in the tabloid newspaper sector, means that tremendous pressure
can be brought to bear on journalists from editors keen for headline-grabbing
back-page copy. The domination of football by television and the rise of new
information sources for fans such as the internet all add to the pressure on the
newspaper sector with its overall long-term declining readership.
Of course the new media do not simply replace the old media; instead a
complex and often mutually dependent relationship develops. For example, it
is not uncommon for football journalists to run with a story they have picked
up from an official club website. Some journalists are even happy to reproduce
stories posted on unofficial fan websites that may relate to transfer speculation
surrounding players.
Broadsheet and tabloid reporting
There has clearly been a broader commercial shift towards an increasing
concern with celebrity news values in the UK press over the last decade or so
(Bromley, 1998; Stephenson, 1998). In addition, concerns have been raised
about the blurring of the traditional boundaries between the broadsheet and
tabloid sections of the newspaper market (Sparks, 1991; Engel, 1996). Yet, we
would argue that within both the UK and Scottish sports press market place
there remain clear distinctions between broadsheet and tabloid sports report-
ing. These are structural differences that have implications for the reporting of
the business of sport. Almost all the broadsheets have increased the resources
they allocate to their sports pages as they attempt to attract new and younger
readers and cash in on the explosion of interest in sports such as football,
which have become an increasingly central ‘product’ to media organizations.
Despite this, it remains the tabloid press that sets the agenda for much of the
electronic media (Tunstall, 1996; McNair 1998).
While the football industry, driven by media organizations which increas-
ingly control and financially underwrite the sport, has changed beyond
recognition, change appears less marked among football journalists. Deadlines
have become more frequent and tighter with technological innovation; there
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are now more sources of information for supporters (with some clubs and even
some players increasingly keen to by-pass journalists completely); more live
football means differing types of reportage are newsworthy, and players have
become wealthy celebrities who no longer appear solely on the back pages of
newspapers. As previously noted, journalists also now routinely use the inter-
net as a source of official and unofficial information lifted from sports websites
which they reconstruct as news or gossip.
The closed world within which journalists and players operate is perhaps
beginning to be transformed as the influence of agents and PR increases. As the
financial rewards for those associated with the game increase dramatically and
the sport is aggressively marketed, agents and PR advisers seek to manage the
news and image of their clients. Journalists such as The Daily Star’s Brian
Woolnough who had written for The Sun for almost three decades noticed
these shifts particularly when reporting on the English national team.
There are too many of us, all fighting over the flesh that is a story or a good
interview. In a way many of the clueless ones have been helped by today’s system
with England. There is hardly any digging needed . . . The FA wheel in the
players, security guards stand around waiting for the interviews to stop, before
the players are whisked off. (Woolnough, 2000: 116)
There is also the continued pressure from news desks with
[T]oo many reporters unable to stand up to constant pressure from their desks
back in London, too many reporters unable to say ‘No, I am not doing that’ and
too many reporters trying to create a quick reputation for themselves.
(Woolnough, 2000: 236)
The professionalization of PR within the game is really in its infancy.
Indeed many clubs are notoriously poor at managing their image and profile.
In this milieu, agents and other unofficial sources can thrive. They often have
longstanding friendships with players and ex-players who work in and around
the game and act as key sources. One significant change is that there are more
media outlets – and journalists – chasing football-related stories.
As the commercialization of sport continues apace, most tabloid news-
papers are simply ill equipped to deal with this change. Some view it as an area
of limited interest to their readers. James Traynor, Sports Editor of the largest
selling newspaper in Scotland, The Daily Record, notes that tabloids lack the
business desk expertise of the broadsheets. However, he argues that his
paper
. . . has tackled the business and financial aspects of football better than other
tabloids and the broadsheets when they’ve written about it in their sports pages,
not when we’ve been competing with their business pages. It’s got to be written
down in a style your market will understand. (Interview, May 2000)
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Both Traynor and Hugh Keevins (who writes for The Sunday Mail, the largest
selling Sunday paper in Scotland) previously worked on Scottish broadsheets,
and note how, on such papers, they simply talked with people from the
finance/business section of the newspaper if they needed specialized advice.
Keevins adds that ‘football writers are going into this [area] completely
blind and we misunderstand and misinterpret’ (interview, May 2000). As we
argue later in this article, while many traditional football writers lack the
financial knowledge to fully understand this growing area of the industry, this
does not stop them reporting on it. A significant structural difference between
the broadsheets and the tabloids here is the apparent barrier that exists
between the sports journalists and other sections of the paper. In other words,
broadsheet newspapers will have journalists with an expert knowledge of the
business side of the industry appearing in their sports pages. Perhaps the
longest standing example of this is The Daily Telegraph columnist, Mihir Bose,
whose specialism includes sports business stories. Other examples include
David Conn’s Inside Football report in The Independent. This happens less
frequently in the Scottish broadsheet market (with fewer resources), and is
non-existent in the tabloid market, where sports journalists are more likely to
attempt to re-train themselves as sports business writers.
This occurs at a time when sports journalists are beginning to find their
protected patch threatened by journalists with backgrounds in law, business,
finance or media issues. In the broadsheet market, where the papers remain
well staffed, there is a growing flow of stories across these traditional bound-
aries. In the tabloids, however, there remains a perception that while stories
related to the business aspect of sport are growing in importance, they do not
yet justify a systematic re-allocation of resources, either material or human. It
is also worth noting that a number of newspapers are themselves part of wider
media organizations which have a vested interest in the growing commerciali-
zation of the industry and which view sport, and football specifically, as
simply another media ‘product’.
This increasing economic synergy between the media and sport is viewed
by some as distinctly unhealthy. The experienced sports journalist Ken Jones
(2000: 43) laments what he sees as the lack of backbone among much
contemporary sports journalism:
Now it isn’t unusual to come across sports reporters who fearfully satisfy the
flawed demands of their superiors. Pointless or insincere quotes have become the
valued substitutes for personnel assessments, making newspapers patsies for
agents, sports goods manufacturers and the new breed of entrepreneur.
This can often lead to a collusion of sorts when the topic under discussion
involves complex financial dealing and issues outwith the journalistic compe-
tence of football reporters. This point was also noted in the Scottish market by
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sports journalist Graham Spiers, then writing for Scotland on Sunday and The
Guardian, and now with The Herald. Speaking of the influence Rangers Chair-
man, David Murray, appeared to exert over the Scottish press, Spiers com-
mented that:
Murray has a great knack of being a puppeteer of newspapers. When you read
some versions of what he is doing at Rangers, the impression is gleaned that he
has almost become the sports editor of certain tabloids. He tosses financial figures
into the air which are dutifully reproduced, usually with a grand sense of
inflation which allows the arithmetic to be pumped up a bit. Last week, for
instance, at Murray’s obvious behest, the Rangers rights issue, which might have
trouble reaching its £53m goal was effortlessly translated by one paper into a
£100m beanfeast for Ibrox. (Scotland on Sunday, 2 April 2000)
Creating a climate of opinion
In contrast to David Murray and other sport entrepreneurs, Fergus McCann
did not enjoy a close relationship with the press. Arguably, this stemmed both
from his personality and from his attitude to the press and other institutions
in Scotland – in particular his apparent unwillingness to court favourable press
coverage. Consequently, the Kerr/Dalglish consortium’s bid for Celtic can only
be understood in terms of a prevailing climate of opinion regarding the club
and its then chairman Fergus McCann. There was a perception at the time that
Celtic were under-achieving, especially on the footballing front. The club was
not prepared to match spending by Rangers on its squad of players and was
trailing Rangers in the league. The popular image of Celtic’s transfer fund
being kept in a ‘biscuit tin’ was perhaps emblematic of this mood. However,
this perception did not simply emerge and it was, in part, the result of
contingent effort on behalf of outside interests. One such actor was Brian
Dempsey, a former director of the club who was instrumental in bringing
McCann back to Scotland as chairman of Celtic. Within the club there was a
perception that Dempsey had begun a campaign to undermine the previous
Celtic board. During this time he retained the services of PR adviser Jack
Irvine. Irvine started the PR consultancy Media House on the back of his
success working for Dempsey and remembers the Celtic board’s PR prior to the
McCann takeover as inept:
They didn’t know how to handle the media, they kept putting their foot in it and
all you needed to do was just gently push them occasionally and they’d do stupid
things and you could just wind them up . . . One of the greatest wind ups we did
was, there was a plan to move Celtic Park to Cambuslang and this environmental
group in Cambuslang sent me a report that all this gunge was coming up through
the ground and that kids were being born with deformities. It was claimed it was
Chernobyl Mark 2. There was never actually any solid evidence. Anyway, I just
gave it to Gerry McNee I think it was at the [Scottish Daily] Express at the time and
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he wrote this as an exclusive, everybody leapt on it and they started doing
cartoons of Celtic players sort of running about with their legs falling off, because
of all the gunge coming up and of course you create that perception and it
became a joke virtually. And it was so easy. (Interview, June 2000)
An intermittent smear campaign against the Celtic board continued
during McCann’s tenure as chairman. Sources within the club recall how
segments of the Scottish media, eager for newsworthy stories about Celtic and
sympathetic to figures such as Dempsey, combined to harm the club’s reputa-
tion. McCann’s frustration with a series of inaccurate media reports led him to
use the club’s official paper, The Celtic View, to publish a vigorous rebuttal
under the heading ‘Dempsey-Balls’.
Reporting the takeover bid 
Funding
In any takeover, a vital consideration is how the bid is to be funded. Surpris-
ingly, in this case, there was little coverage of how the consortium intended to
fund its acquisition of Celtic. Instead, the majority of reporting by sports
journalists concentrated solely on the emotional appeal of the bidders, in
particular on the return of ‘King Kenny’ [Dalglish]. Interestingly, from the
moment the consortium’s intention became clear, many papers concentrated
on portraying its ‘bid’ as being in the best interests of the fans, further
asserting that the consortium led by the ‘dream-team’ of Dalglish and Kerr
would have the wholehearted backing of those supporters.
Some of the reporting by financial journalists did extend beyond emotion
to address the issue of funding and its implications. A key point was that the
bid was to be funded by City institutions. Consequently, if the bid was
successful, Celtic would end up being partly owned by those institutions. An
editorial in The Scotsman (12 November 1998) carried the memorable quote
that ‘CFC [could] stand for City Funded Consortium, which may be a much
less palatable play for the fans, even if King Kenny is involved’.
The Scotsman’s football journalist, Glenn Gibbons, followed up this issue.
After an open press conference, he recalled trying to get the consortium’s
advisers to acknowledge that a successful takeover by the consortium would
result in its financial backers (Bankers’ Trust) owning Celtic.
McAvoy [Consortium] said how we’ve [the consortium] got backing from one of
the biggest banks in the world.
Gibbons: ‘You mean you’re being financed by them? The deal’s being financed by
them . . . they’ll own the club?’
‘No, no, they’re coming in as investors.’
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I said to him: ‘You see this investment of £30–40 million, how’s that going to get
into the club? . . . there’s only two ways of putting it in, as new shares or a loan
. . . Oh, there’s a third way, they can give a donation. The banks, though, are not
really famous for that.’ (Interview, May 2000)
Gibbons had two key observations on this exchange. First, that the con-
sortium’s adviser was unnerved because he had not expected this type of
question from sports reporters. Second, ‘the surprise on a lot of fellow re-
porters’ faces because they were all football writers and they hadn’t thought
about all this’ (interview, May 2000). As we shall see later, much of the
consortium’s planning for this press conference was centred on how to
communicate the role of the merchant bank backing the bid.
A more fundamental question was whether the consortium could even
afford the takeover. Rule 2.5 of The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers states
that the company must be in a position financially to acquire all of the issued
share capital of the target company. The consortium therefore required suffi-
cient funding to acquire not only Fergus McCann’s 51 percent stake but also to
offer the same terms to the other 10,000 or so shareholders who owned the
remaining shares in Celtic plc. While some doubts were raised about the
consortium’s ability to comply with this condition, it received relatively scant
attention. Instead emotion and celebrity were deployed as a substitute for
technical comment or analysis.
For example, in The Herald (12 November 1998), Keith Aitken signalled
that the consortium might have trouble raising its £50 million bid for
McCann’s shareholding up to approximately £100 million if it had to tender
for all Celtic’s shares. Despite this financial concern, Aitken blithely stated that
the two aces up the consortium’s sleeve were the emotional link between the
fans and Dalglish and the availability of substantial funds for player transfers.
The fate of this transfer kitty should the consortium have to buy shares in
addition to McCann’s was not considered. Other papers did not even raise the
issue of affording the bid. Typically, The Sun (12 November 1998) instead
enthused over the wealth of the consortium’s key players: ‘their quickfire rise
in the jet-set world of high finance proves [they] have the clout to make Fergus
[McCann] an offer he could find impossible to snub’; or again played the
emotional card: ‘Dalglish and Kerr are crucial to the plan – two mega-rich Celtic
men who can be assured of the backing of the powerful Celtic support’.
Failure to address this fundamental issue of being able to afford what you
are seeking to buy is surprising. In an interview with one sports journalist he
bemoaned the failure of his colleagues to challenge the staggering ineptitude
shown by the consortium in making an offer, which, if all the shareholders
accepted, it could not afford.
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One possible explanation is that buying something you cannot afford,
usually players, is simply an accepted part of football’s way of doing business.1
Alternative explanations relate to an unwillingness on the part of sports
journalists to challenge either their sources or the cult of personality on which
football, and football reporting, is so dependent. This leaves them vulnerable
at best to misrepresenting the story, at worst to creating the story. As stated,
much of the coverage of the consortium’s bid focused on its alleged emotional
appeal. Many journalists were seemingly subsumed by the celebrity of the
consortium, led by the returning ‘King Kenny’. An interesting aspect of the
story was the way this myth (the popularity of the consortium amongst Celtic
supporters) was created, despite the absence of any substantive evidence. The
PR advisers to the consortium continually emphasized the popularity and
legitimacy of the consortium with fans as part of their communication
strategy. This spin was uncritically reported by most journalists covering the
story. One journalist was particularly scathing in his condemnation of the
tabloids in this regard:
For me the tabloids got it wrong, particularly about [the notion of the voice of
the fans], about this panting enthusiasm for Kenny. ‘King Kenny’ and all that.
The story was media led and media driven. It wasn’t the fans at all. (Interview,
May, 2000)
The absence of any meaningful analysis of Fergus McCann’s own proposal
for disposing of his shares, in which supporters were to be given first option on
purchasing his shares, was striking. One of the few journalists to address this
issue was Paul Stokes, then deputy business editor of The Scotsman. He
noted:
The stuff I was writing was saying that this consortium was trying to pass
themselves off as the fans’ champion, whereas there was a person here [Fergus
McCann] saying ‘I want to sell the club to the fans.’ What more could you ask for
as a fan of Celtic than to be offered a chance to own your own club? (Interview,
May, 2000)
Again this can be partially explained by the media’s focus on personality.
McCann’s manner and personality had certainly not endeared him to many in
the media. More pertinently, he was also not a conventional operator in
Scottish football: much of the football media seemed unwilling or unable to
accept that someone in the football business might actually do what he had
said he was going to do. As Paul Stokes noted:
Fergus came in and said ‘I’ll stay for five years. After I have been there for five
years I will have built the stadium, stabilized the business . . . and I will have a
share issue and I will endeavor to give as much as I can to the fans.’ Nobody
believed him, they thought obviously there is an alternative motive . . . a lot of
poisonous information was put out against Fergus. (Interview, May, 2000)
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Acquiring knowledge
Although the business of football is not inherently complex, there are techni-
cal issues with which journalists must deal. Several journalists we interviewed
observed that their own ignorance was the major obstacle they faced in
reporting the business of football. Nevertheless, this problem could be over-
come by speaking to people who understood the issues.
Problems remain, however, when journalists fail either to familiarize
themselves with the issues or seek expert advice. Jim Traynor of The Daily
Record suggested that in contemporary journalism ‘there are too many lazy
journalists about’ (interview, May 2000). The business journalist and PR
consultant, Maurice Smith, recently bemoaned media analysis of the business
logic of the proposed new European League (involving the Old Firm), asking
‘So when did our armchair sports commentators become business experts?’
(Sunday Herald, 20 August 2000). This is exacerbated by the preference among
sports journalists for relying on traditional sources, often former players or
managers, to provide ‘expert’ analysis, irrespective of whether the issue under
discussion relates to their area of expertise. Following Celtic’s 1999/2000
Scottish Cup defeat by Inverness Caledonian Thistle, Alan Wright wrote in The
Scotsman: ‘Defeat costly for investors as Celtic shares take a dive’. The former
Celtic manager and player, Billy McNeill, was quoted as saying ‘obviously they
[the plc board] must be worried about that amount of money being wiped off
the club’s resources’.
This quote is illustrative of many inadequacies in the reporting of the
business of football. While it is likely that the directors of any plc will be
concerned about adverse share price movements it is wrong to assert that these
movements have an effect on ‘the club’s resources’. The company’s resources
are unaffected directly by movements in its share price.2 The price is deter-
mined by the supply and demand for those shares in the Stock Exchange and,
importantly in the context of thinly traded shares in football clubs, by market
makers adjusting the prices at which they will trade those shares (Morrow,
1999: 93–107).3 In communicating reality, the journalist has constructed
reality (Hines, 1988), introducing spurious concern about one of the key
interests of football supporters, namely the availability of funds.
The reporting of the process of ‘due diligence’ in the takeover demon-
strates either the reluctance of journalists to overcome their knowledge gap in
relation to financial matters or their wilful misrepresentation of the facts. Due
diligence is a process common to all takeovers, whereby a potential buyer
makes sure that it fully understands everything it can, both financial and
operational, about the anatomy of the company it is considering buying.
However, this is not the interpretation one would have gained from reading
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some accounts. Jonathan Kennedy, a PR adviser to the consortium, recalled a
conversation with one journalist on this issue, noting that:
[He] couldn’t quite grasp that [this was a standard procedure in any business
acquisition], well he maybe didn’t want to get it. But the way he reported it was
something like one of the stumbling blocks was a procedure called due diligence
. . . and he alluded to the fact that this could be unusual . . . and that maybe
something was slightly amiss. (Interview, June 2000)
One explanation for this type of behaviour is that it arises out of assump-
tions about the readership of particular papers, namely that they are not an
elite who will be interested (or knowledgeable) about financial matters. The
tendency to reduce all reporting either to issues of personality or to football’s
‘bottom line’ (how much is available for transfers?) is therefore perhaps
understandable. Jim Traynor, sports editor of the influential Daily Record,
commented that stories about the business side of sport are unlikely to be of
interest to its readers ‘unless it was a story saying that they’ve vastly overspent
and the club is going to close’ (interview, May, 2000). Hugh Keevins of The
Sunday Mail noted that fans were not interested in financial intricacies, ‘the
fan wants to know how much we will get . . . and how much of that can we
spend’ (interview, May, 2000). Glenn Gibbons of The Scotsman noted that ‘[the
tabloids] think that for their readers the financial stories are quite dull really,
because they don’t have personalities in them’ (interview, May, 2000).
Communicating the consortium
The particularities of the Scottish media scene and the relationships between
sports journalists and their sources were an important feature of the media’s
coverage of the Dalglish/Kerr consortium bid for Celtic. The differences
between business and sports journalists’ treatment of the issue is noteworthy.
Another dimension of the story within the Scottish media landscape was the
role played by PR professionals in mediating the story. The consortium’s PR
handlers did not easily satisfy the journalists’ appetite for information. Jona-
than Kennedy recounts:
The questions that were being asked: How much? When? Who’s going to be in
charge? Who’s the new coach? Are you going to sign somebody new? Are you
going to set up a training school? . . . All these questions which were hugely
speculative, but illustrate the desire for information, of what this meant. But
because of the commercial restrictions, i.e. you don’t discuss a bid openly
anyway, or any discussion like that [and] the legal restrictions, because of the plc
aspect of it, anything you were saying could affect share prices or anything to do
with the market. It’s all got to be done prior to open, or after close, of the market.
(Interview, June 2000)
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While communicating the technical aspects of the bid was to prove
troublesome for the consortium, the same could not be said in terms of
attracting publicity for it’s efforts. The celebrity of the consortium’s figure-
heads made their actions irresistible for those sitting behind Scottish news and
sports desks:
I mean you’ve got Celtic, Kenny Dalglish and arguably the most famous Scottish
rock star . . . I think again [the] media profile was delicious stuff for the [sports]
editors and the news editors, they were probably whooping with delight with
these three names. (Interview, June, 2000)
The profile of the bidders ensured extraordinary publicity for the con-
sortium, and made it easy for them to claim to represent most Celtic fans and
shareholders. This is particularly true of the tabloid coverage, which has
undergone an undoubted shift in the past decade towards celebrity-led con-
tent. Under Fergus McCann, a public share issue took place in January 1995
which raised £9.4 million for Celtic and created 10,500 new shareholders, the
vast majority of whom were Celtic supporters. A key part of the consortium’s
communication strategy was to appeal to those shareholding supporters, to
persuade them that the bid was in the best interests of Celtic, and that
crucially they should hold onto their personal shareholdings. As the con-
sortium saw it, the target of their limited funds had to be Fergus McCann’s
personal majority shareholding.
The problem lay in the fact that McCann was determined to offer his
shares to existing shareholders. This difficulty was not helped by the fact that
McCann harboured considerable antipathy for ‘populist’ spokespersons pur-
portedly representing the ‘real’ Celtic-minded fan. However, the platform
afforded by the media to the consortium did create some communication
difficulties for those managing its PR. As Jonathan Kennedy notes:
I mean Jim Kerr, by his pure nature is a front man and he certainly said things
that you might not normally have done in the PR world. In an ideal situation,
you might not have been quite as vociferous as he was . . . He was quite difficult
to control. (Interview, June 2000)
This lack of discipline had been evident when the initial takeover story
was leaked to the media on 10 November 1998. A first casualty was the original
merchant banker to the consortium, Salomon Smith Barney, who withdrew,
‘outraged’, as soon as the deal, and its participation, became public (Sinclair et
al., 1998: 1). As rumours spread regarding the planned bid, the Takeover Panel
forced the consortium to make an official announcement. This had the effect
of pushing the share price (and therefore cost of the club to the bidders) even
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higher, and signalled that this takeover bid would be a very different creature
from most seen in the City. One City analyst was reported as saying:
The fact that this bid has become public at such an early stage suggests it is being
shoddily run. The leak of news of any proposed bid at the stage when news of this
one came out was so premature it was unreal. (Sinclair et al., 1998: 3)
The publicity surrounding the consortium’s bid for Celtic highlighted an
enduring element of City practice – the secrecy that pervades financial news
flows and reporting. The celebrity of the consortium increased the demand for
news about the bid. Nevertheless, the financial actors involved were keen to
remain in the background. An example of their reticence to enter the public
gaze can be found in the following vignette outlined by Kennedy. Referring to
the consortium’s planning for a high-profile press conference, Kennedy re-
called:
I said my personal feeling is that [Bankers’ Trust] should make an appearance and
show a face, make a statement and leave the press conference, if that’s what you
want to do. Just stand and say ‘I’m so and so from Bankers’ Trust, just wanted to
put a face to the name’ type of thing, ‘[I] can confirm as a consortium we are in
discussion with Celtic, because of financial, commercial, legal reason[s] we’re not
in a position to discuss the business part of the bid, but the guys here [Kerr/
Dalglish] will talk about the football aspect and why they want to do it and I’ll
leave them to it’, and leave. [However] the decision was made that they wouldn’t
appear, that Jim McAvoy would be seen as the business face . . . The way we did
it, we simply positioned Bankers’ Trust as the funders of the consortium.
(Interview, June 2000)
Despite such efforts, there remained ambiguity regarding the consortium’s
business plan. A related difficulty, acknowledged by the PRs for the con-
sortium, was their struggle to differentiate the Bankers’ Trust’s investment in
the club from that of a conventional bank loan. This uncertainty surrounding
the financing of the bid played to the interests of the Celtic board. Its PR
strategy re-emphasized McCann’s original plan to sell his shares to existing
shareholders, including many fans, which in turn would preserve Celtic as a
unique social institution.
The proposed bid ultimately fizzled out and when, after five years at the
helm of Celtic, Fergus McCann decide to sell up and leave Scotland, as he had
always stated he would do, he sold his shares, not to City investors, but rather
to existing shareholders and season ticket holders. As Cannon and Hamil
(2000: 46) have commented this was in marked contrast to Manchester
United’s Martin Edwards, who in the same month sold £41 million of his
shares to institutional investors.
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Conclusion
As football has become big business over the last decade and money has flowed
into the higher echelons of the game the relationship between players and
journalists has changed. Patrick Barclay of The Sunday Telegraph noted:
Journalists need to be able to have personal relationships with the players and
the coaching staff and that’s becoming more difficult because it is increasingly
difficult to have chance encounters with them. (WSC, 2000: 24)
Football clubs are actively seeking to control their relationships with the
media. The recent appointment of Financial Times journalist Patrick Harverson
as director of communication for Manchester United suggests a growing
recognition of the importance of communication with all of a club’s stake-
holders. Moreover, media coverage of football ‘stars’ has never been more
extensive, as players such as David Beckham and Michael Owen seek to
control, market and promote a particular image of themselves in a highly
commercial market place. We might also suggest that in the smaller Scottish
market there remains a greater opportunity for such chance encounters men-
tioned by Barclay above. It is this area of the game that editors still feel
interests their readers more than the mundane, but potentially significant,
developments in sports business.
As this case study has attempted to illustrate, much of the growing and
complex business side of the game, as it interfaces with the media and
commerce, either goes largely unreported or is treated superficially. In part this
is because many traditional sports journalists have been slow to adapt their
professional practice. They remain under pressure to produce stories that help
sell newspapers, while aware that this has become more difficult as media
coverage and competition for stories expand. Intermediaries such as PRs and
agents therefore become attractive sources to the sports media. Our case study
demonstrates the ability of professional communicators to influence media
coverage, but also shows the gap between media reporting and boardroom
decision-making. The lesson of the consortium’s efforts to buy Celtic is the
spectacular failure of spin to change the opinion of the key decision-maker,
Fergus McCann.
Nevertheless, as the business of sport becomes increasingly important,
journalists with financial backgrounds will encroach on traditional sports
reporting as interest in football extends into the media and business pages of
newspapers. Driven by a content-hungry media, there appears little sign that
the importance of the business of sport is set to diminish. One challenge faced
by sports desks will be their willingness to add business expertise to their
personnel, as this part of the football industry becomes increasingly
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important. This research indicates that among the tabloid press this expansion
will remain unlikely and that celebrity-driven stories will, in fact, increase as
the commercial importance of the sports star continues to grow (Andrews and
Jackson, 2001).
The media’s heightened interest in business and financial matters is
reflected in the increased volume of media reporting of the business of
football. Concerns remain, however, about much of its quality, in particular an
unwillingness among some sports journalists to recognize that football busi-
ness stories cannot be reported in the same way as more conventional football
stories. This is evident in terms of an over-reliance on celebrity sources, and
also the reporting of football business stories as stories about football business-
men. One consequence of this personalization is that sports business reporting
becomes embedded in its subject rather than illuminating it (Rowe, 1991). A
further problem identified is lack of knowledge. This evidences itself in two
ways: directly, in the lack of knowledge or experience of sports reporters of
reporting business stories, and indirectly, by implicit assumptions about the
lack of knowledge or interest in business or financial matters among a paper’s
readership.
This failure to illuminate the business of football is surprising given the
increased demands from one of football’s key stakeholders, the supporters, for
improved accountability and transparency in clubs’ business activities. As
football clubs have adopted more business-oriented structures (e.g. through
Stock Exchange listings), supporters have sought to demand stakeholder, and
indeed often shareholder, rights and responsibilities. One example of this
trend is the movement towards supporters’ trusts in football clubs, an initia-
tive backed by the UK government. Given that these demands largely arise
from the changing business structures found in many football clubs, it is
disappointing that the traditional media have been reluctant to deal more
rigorously with reporting the business of football.
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Notes
1 A recent high-profile example of this practice was Real Madrid’s decision to spend
£37 million acquiring Luis Figo despite reported debts of £180 million.
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2 Indirectly, there may be an effect on the club’s future resources. For example,
should the club wish to raise capital by a rights issue to existing shareholders, the
price at which the issue is made, and hence the amount that is raised, would be
affected by the share price.
3 Low trading is particularly evident at Celtic where a large percentage of the shares
are held by supporters and hence are largely unaffected by conventional financial
influences (Morrow, 2000).
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